or critical perspectives on. Ir.J.uf.leJ.:-I.ll :::-l UiUL1.g1.l.L t11al lugelI1-t:::J:-sll,c-\r-e lTle vievv 1.111a( 1_1-..~ r-..-.oder-ni:s.t (".f~i.df-!nu~ oUr 1:lI-.irie:djo ct=-:-~-1.a.f'" kr'c~tvvlot=::,(lg-t;=": j~ no(=:it:h("::]" t-(":-aJizal~l~ 1.""lor c:oh.~re:l."'l.t:_ On~ vvay i1."'l ",,"l'l.io;-;h t:l1is is ofte-:n. e:xpresse-d is iTl. t:l1e for:tr:l o f .a c.rit:iq"L~e. or essentialisIrl,. .OT .-he idea that" SL1-ch classical cpistc.rI:101ogic:al Ilotions as true) reru,:o correct" logically I1ecessary; a.r::ld tile like are req-...:tir-ed fO"U.Ilciatior:1s for science aI1ci undcrstaIlding . .l\/.I.a::ny postrrl.oci("':;rr1.ists doul"")t 1:1""la.:t: these rl-()·tiOTlS are ultiII1a.Lely viaLle .. aIH.-i a:tld is per~l;l.a.sive "in .::::t. varip.l.y of "'-'Vays to. :an. in.crea.sirl.g nLl.rn .h~r of" thinkers.> ir1.cludin...~ ma.ny tra. ..in..ecl in.. an..d still largely sy.rn..pat:het:ic. to rr:l.oder:n.ist tc.:n.e.t:s. In. this cha.ptcr I arr:l. clllcfly i.n.1:erested in t:h.e future t:::rajectory 01 post:rr:Locler:n.is:n:::J..!, espec.ially a.s Ll:.te elIorls o r its prOp0. 1.le..n.t .c:cUJ t~~e::::;. rLJ nc:1.icJf'" •. "-:-1 gen.erate n..e~ tho"U..ght. Surely aIle 01 1:he key perspectives postr.noclern.jsrn. offers is the idea. that thcrught is COTl.ti.n..u..cH.l.s1y dyn.arn..ic. a:n.d ope.n. e.:n.decl rather th.a:n. a..b . ...... a..ys c.o.ll..vcrgin..g to~a.. rd a. sin.gle set: o-f-static trLlth.s~ the :t:rl.oclern.ist idea.L ..is it. I.hen t.oo n"ll.Jch '-"~J a:=.:.k (i-H' l11l't:he:.-ana.lysis. of"" tl"1.is clyl.~an.""J.ic:al l"")o"-oc:~s.s an..cl Tor disc"l..."lssiorl.. of~ vvhat: ""this ""'I.:U::t.-SYS1:e.rX1""' ll.l.volves IIl.eI.1..s .... l.ra.te discourses, whether at a point in time 01 across till_1C, is a subject which we can cohe.rently investigate in analyzing how people disagree ""ith ()ill-! (lJ1tltlLt:l'. Th.i~ topic is the chief theme of thi~ r:hapt.r:r. Second, prar:tically xp~aling, it seems ilnperalive [rom a prugrcj:ijyc JX'litical point of view thM pOfItmori.cruist& learn bow to defelld (JpellIH':~s, pluralism, ami lolerance in discourse against reactionary form!; of modernism. Doing thi~, Ilowevr:I', .lll'\iolvcs both showing' dearly and reasonably persuasively how morl~rni~m c.an be morally .rmn politically unhealthy for society; and also showing that there exists a handful of "essentials" underlying the non-anar'chic play of competing di~L:Uurscl) iliat explain how a posnnode:rn world is livable. This topic is a set:oIldary them.e of this chapter touchcd upon in the last section belm¥.
1Iy position :might then be best put as holding that nihilism -or the view that we can only record mOIlleuts of undecidability1 disorder:, and illdelerminacy -is misguided, hut th8t what might altr:rnatively be termed principl"ll relalivism -as will be set forth here -is meaningful and desirable. In wh;.jt follmv!'; T tty to investigate conditions that might fulfill and ciJaractL::l'l:';c a principled relativism, and then turn to look critically Oil jJosunoderni"t njhi1i~m. In the [:m;t s-t'.clion, a.
clilemma IS first pos~rl filT postrIl(){l .. rnisl di~(;Ow'se analysis thal I sugg't:sL derives from its past path of dcvdopmcnt :1..'\ a, R~t of ideas critical of morl~rni;;m. In the second section, Olle mcal18 of addressing this dilemma is set out -in terms of a discusslOlI or whaL I Lefm identity conditions for rnscour&:S. In the third section, I tnrn In market exc.hange models used to ~lllc.i(lat.f: interaction ben'VeeTl discourses to give a specifically economic application of the idea of identity conditions for discourses, and then reexamine the original dilemma and its suggested solulioll [rulIl chis new vantage point. In thl:: Lilla! section, I briefly address the i;/":conoary th~me of the chapter, argl.l~ iTl favor llf principled relativism and against nihilism, and make a number of eonc111oing remarks about poliLical-ethical issues that postrnout:I"uism rai::;es against modernism.
A postrn.odernist non-conunumcation dile:nun.a.
III Ule ·wllecLion of papers from the 1994 conference "Pluralism -in Economics: The(lr)~ Hislory and Methodology" (Salanti and Screpallti 1996) in Dcrgarmo, Tt<l.l A second, stronger claim Samuels makes is that "there is a hmdamcntal, tautological relationship between the assumed principles of l.'lOwlcdgc acquisiLiolJ awllhe knowledge which is produced" (1" 68). Perhaps "tautological" is too strong a tP.rm heTe, but it mllSt at least he close to the sense of Samuels' position, which is also expressed in terms of an idea ,-vidcly accepted among postmodernists that one cannot ~~step out" of olle's O\\lll discow'st; Lhal is, l.here is something inherendy contradictory about the idea that on~ might he of!ISJched from the way ODe sees things. I think that there is a dilemma here that results Ii'om 'C-OUjUllliug' lh~ second propusiLion lhal knowledge L-; ,c;omt"l1ow tied to it3 conditions of pl'(jductloll Lu Ule VroPUSi !.iOH knowledge is tied to its conditions of production; and 2 there arc many distinct discourses on any given su~jcct (because the conditions of knowledge production are diverse).
From thi" it fo11o-w8 that: ~ Ilu-;n-~ t:flTl h~ TlO lllliqll~ mt:'t;-J-di~cOl1r!:>e on ;my sl.lbject.
But from this one might also plausibly inier that: 4 different discours es and their producers are non-communicating.
This conclusion, however) surely po~es a dilemma for postmodernism and its crilique of Hlmk:mism. OLl lhe 011C baml, if Ji[[eI'~nl Ji~eoun;es and their pmdncf:rs arf: non-mmmlJn;cal'.ing, thf:n nn. on~ is in a. p(l!;itinn to confidently ~ay that there is no single meta-discourse -and thm argue that th~ project of modernigm is ml&conceived, In effect) undecidability across diJIcrcm discourses. unuermiIlt::l uefense of the (s.hared) claim that. there :lli no single meta-discourse. On [he ()l:h~T hand, if po~tmorl~Tnist~ ;Jgrt:'e that the modernist project is misconceived) then explicitly shared ground does seem to exist ben.veen discourses after all. 'i'his both raises doubts about the postmodcrnt.sf. crilique uf cssc[Jlialj~l modernism. I and suggests tha.t knowledge production may not be that closely tied to its conditions of production.
T think thi~ dilem ma mote difficult to discharge than many pU~llllod cfl: USI.3 might suppose. In a se nse, it is one member of the class of the ancien t on r.-;\nd-hf': -m~.ny or nnity-n.nrl-pluralit:y paradoxt:l-1 that fIrst received eSIJet:ially de.ar l;,xprt:"s~ion in CI)III1~()i(ln with Pla10'~ tl1F:ory of forms. Plato's problem was how instances of things dissimilar and yet related to one another each fell WIder some Lmivenal category rep resenting thei r sha.r~ci q \lality. Here in its conter:npo ' .-l.ry form the problem :is rnanif~t<:::d in lilt u ual deJlland that discourses be dissim ilar in nature, yet also share a common, motivating moment {that there is no metadiscourse submming the m, the prqject of esse.nriaJist mod~rnNm}. The plurality sldt: of there bein g dive.rse discourscs is self-t:\i.UtI1l, Lul perhaps it seems odd to say that different discourses must share a u nity in something's non-existence or in the absence of a meta-digcourse. To say, however> thal difftreJ\( di.~(:oIJr~f. s an~ e;'H:h dissfwiall':d rl"llTTl fI. ~iflglc cxx~n.Lial.ist language is to l"Ilake UIlC impurlaul da.i.m abouL tlle origills and n ature of each, It is to 3ay that each possesses a specificity or particularity that derives from their like resistance t1) translatiull WlO one gnn~T~l laHg ll<tgl;". (lr logic:. Rllt thr.1l it i!li one general language that define~ them all, if only ill a m :gativc ~cn.'Ic. The di1emma at hand, th en, concerns the nnpLications of emph<lslzing eith l:' : r th~ p lurality or the. unity side.s of postmodernis111 '5 combil1ll1.g a defeme uf d.ivcl"~i.ty <\nd a 1l111t.uaJ dt'lr.andng from moderrust essentialism.
Of course ail d.iLernroas are dispellable to the extent that one ;~ ".,.illing t.o r. mhrar:~ th~ mnse qu~nc~.'i of taking one h orn or the other of 1111:: llile;:IIUll ii. roc fJOs lmociernists,l suggest., the p roCCs."l of futurc adjustment >vil.I req uire becoming clearer about the idea that discourses appear non.communicatin g. Sa}'wg: ili<tt different discourses are not hadcerl hy a r.omrnon meta-<liscourse make; discourses out lu be uon·wuunullit..:aling-ill only one specific. scnsc. Are there, then, other fonn~ of linkage or corrununicatlou between discourses compatible with thi~? And might these other [onus ul liuk<1.gf.: or r:omnmnir:.atinn preserve both the specificity of different discourses :in It:l"Im:i uf" lhei1" separate conditions of production and yet still support a critique of essentialist modernism ? S:lmlleli> wrmlrl allow th at th~re an~ indeed forms of comm~uricaliun bt:!wl;c.I.I Ji . R;IJ~H·~ (I(her [han just th r. shan,:n n-jc:c:tion of a single meta-discourse, since h e does not embrace the conclusion of the reconstructed argument above that radical noncommunication is a necessary implir:atio n of discourses h aving dive rse conditions uf Vl"Oduc..:tion. In sayil.lg how eke discourses · c.ommunieatc 1 then, we mi,~ht attempt to resolve the dilemma above by sho..,..,ing that there are linkages hNwf:f:n dif',tinr.t ciij;f,()ur:-eR that do not imply essentiali~t f:::J.t.p.gori~s.
NOLe lllat an alternative resolution of Ult: dilemma. hert wuuld be simply to embrace non-communication in a radical fashion> thereby glyjng up the search for a form of co mmunication between discourses <Lnd also a sharw c.:ri liq ut:! ur IfII) d f:rn is.t. mda-clisC":Ol II' l' W_ In !:fi'cct, mOdCl"lltsnl would be defeated simply by lht:
practice of individuals always operating in terms of self-contained discourses, rarher than by argument Thi~ n ihil i!\t solution, h owever, seems an undeslrdble way of dispelling tho:.~ d,ilcmma r:.1.~:.I !1g jll"lst lllodc:rnism, chiefly because an articulate critique of modernist essentialism is pTellumably important to the defense o[ diversity. But before developing this conclusion in the last section b e1ow/ attention ought fir.<:t hI' : givf':n In how ir: might. hI". t.hnllgh l. that. the dilemma set forth ai"xm:
ha~ come: ahnlJl. hi s r J:)J"it~ally with llw f:1llf: r-gr:: n c;e.: (lr p(J~lmlJderIliSIll.
My thesis here is that the dilenuna iacj n~ postmodernism has its origins in the way in which po!)tJT)oderni@ll historically developed as a critique of moclr.rni!'\m. SUPPO::H:: -lu tell a : : iliglltly apucryphal ::ilury -that scholars struggled for m. an)' years with the classic, m od ernist corresp ondence problem regarding h ow our representations of the world relate to the v/Odd. These scholars' difficulty tor many years was that they believed there to be one underlying: n-.dli l>·, tIl( lu g·h ' I.IIt')' io und th emselvc~ committed to competing and often incommensurate ways of representing that reaJ.it}~ Finally after many years of frustratio n and fruitless debate over who~c rcprc~cntation of rc:ality ~ras C'o rl"l':ct, snrnF. :;;clll:ll ar':i-"::;,~CI"led that the idea of a. single, independent underlying reality must itself be contradictory, because -reasonably enough -the idea o( a single reality is itself a d i~urs iVf: itr.ln, and all di~r; UI-:)i",'e: j (C::HI~ f.ll.l::i.r:.S~ mulLiple senses. There only (":xi~t.
-these P08Ln:oui::m il >U lh<: : :n argueu -ui.fn~rt: Ul diocourst!s,-or. d ifferent modes of representation. But now the dilemma eme.rp;es. T hat it was originally thought lhal th t'l"t' nist gemu.ndy distinct, alternative: discourses depende d on lht: itlt".a that> were there a sinp;le: un ique underlying reality:. thcn there had to be a single.
unique mode of representation of that reality. That is, the idea of the distinct- ~IT"~ concept of dilterence as unlqueness is an inadvertent inheritance from 1rI(I( l f~Tlli s rrl. lJlli f JlI t! n~s.'\, it s~~ms ra ir t.o SiiY> i') ;.In essentialist notion in that it depends on lhe idea of a ~i.IJgle COlTt$!JoJlue;:m .:t; lu a :si.ngle: reality, To say something is unjque i.nvolves making a complete and comprehensive survey of the world, in order LO say that one and one thing only occupir:s a t"":t':"rta.in pl:'J.c:f' " in that ",,"orld, nut postmodernists need not explain differel1ce in term s of the Idea. of uniqueness. T h ere are other ways of explaining-thc concept of diflerc nce that postlnonl":"rnism mig ht.li.dnpt -way!'\ whit~h w~ \v(II Jld hope would HlHkt speaking about differcnec compatihle with. jointly dr. Jlying a .'lingle mc:ta-rfis(,;OI ll'. "f' : f' ::<i. <;ls, sustain the critique of modernism, and thus serve to dispel the dilenuna abov\.':.
\'\'hal. this s lJgg(>;.<;.t~ is t.ha t. for prn;t.moof':rnist t.hinking to be sl.IccessfiJJ it needs to hI': dahol"atf:d indt':l~ndl':"lly or thili. r:r ;tiflll~ or ltll)r.lr:nl;:5H.1. tlml ~p("t.:i!kally tn.·als discourses as self-con tained and non-communicating. "\Vhat ia rather needed, more specjficall)~ is an account of discourses' relative autonomy from om: HiU ]ok .. H. iJavis another, ,~ince an acc:mmt nf this sort would presumably make a discourse s lli::;lim. : lues:; a function of its laleral jIlXI<lJ.1~l$iti.on to oth~r dhcourses, rather than a fun ction of its possession of the e~<:.entia1 i s t property of uniquene::.s. I now turn tu lim ... such an account might hP. ~ttempted .
Identity conditions for discourses
If essentialist reasoning tries to explain r epresentation in terms of correspon· dence to something 111' :' YOI)(\ l'I': prt::~r:. I1If\liou. !lull-essentialist rea:;oning strives to remain "i. As a concept, it thus contributes to our picking· out the boundary between the two klTlliS of argunH':n t. Til dfFrl:, if'~ rlilTF.rF.1l1 ial riH.lly)pria.tiun iu. lhc. two discourses tclh us where the two discour::;cs both eomc into c.ontact and yet rf':main di.~l iJld.
Som e, perhaps, will think this conception of a discourse with t. wo different types of concepts cumbersome and l.mnecessary to explaining the relati.v~ autonomy or iuenli ly uf Jiscount:~. 'rV' by HoI simply explain what makes discourses cfutinct and dille rent in terms of their constitutive notions alond Tilc 11Il lhh~1 1I wi' -h pnu: ... . edillg in this mannt;:r is that it l{'.avc~ us with postmoderni'ml':': apples and oran~e s, non-communication problem. If a discourse's constitut ive wncepts are spedfic to that discOtrrse alone, then in attr.nciing ~ol d y 1:0 thf' m we lack u way of relating discourses to one another. H owever, in differcn tiating bet\'\'een a SIngle discourse's constitutive and non-cons.titutive concepts we put ourselves in a position to explain that di~r.oUl"3 C '!\ -identity !ipr:r.ific.ally a~ a ff': l<l fh:e autonomy, o r as an autonomy relative to other discow'SCs. 'lbe key to this (:{)Ucepcion, it should now be apparent, is in being able l(l:'lay thai. hUlll I.YJl(~ or concepts must operate in any given discourse. N ot just a diseourse:s constitutive concepts, but also its assoc.iated penumbra of non-mmtitl. 1 t.ivp. c()nc:~prs must: be sccn as nccessary to the understanding of that discourse.
O f r:nm!w., s::lying 1. hal: n nn-c.on~tiT.llti ve con cepts are as necessary to a discotU'Sc as afC it:l cOnStilu!.iv{: f:OIlt:t:JlL'I ~Ollll(l'i. Deltl, h ul II . ... " i.;; :iJl 
Market exchange and discursive interaction
1\,{arkets typically involvt<! ne.cf!ntra1i7.ed exch ange beh· .... een economic agents spel:ialized in different types ()f pn....-lu c:tion wirhin ~Il overall d,v~ioJl Qf l~bor. N/:' .or;la!3slcaJ econ omic the.ory gif.nf!rally gives the idea of exchange a decidedly modernist interpretation by representing economic agents as atomistic individ, uats, each will i th eir uvm wd1-ddined endowmenls amI axlOlfialically dl~~CTit}f-';(! preferences, whose exchange "villi one another generates gains from trade for each; a.:. if lhruugh the mechanism of an invisible h and. Tak..iug Ll I~ a.s a rnmld for th:: illtt: ral :l.iuli of different discourses, a neodas.<;ic:ist might th en ~my that though inn ivirl1l aJ discoune producers eaeh have their own linguistic cndowments and conccptual preferelK.t':3, llleir mSl:univc; trade and interaction with one anOilif:f ref1f':C': t~ an llnderlying logic or meta-discourse that to neoclassical economists worb much like how universal constrained optinlization results in a general equilibrium between imlcpcIlIleul producers. Just as, that is, seemingly" veey different economic agents' trade with one another reflects one, underlying meta-discourse of bade that may be e<ljJluroo in sels of ~q uations whose joint w lutiun can be proven to exl!'it, :10 that rl i sc.oll t'!'i~ and their producers generally; on the tTaditional neoclassicaJ model of market exchange, preswnably 5hare a couunOJl meta-language or deep grammar that makcs conuuunlcalio ll p~ilJlt: .
Thf'.re :tre ways, bmvever, to repre.sf:nt markf:t e.xr:h:m ge as a model Jor discursive interaction that bypass the modcrni3t :features of thc neoclassical accouu L Distinguish.ing bt:l WCCll ~{e thodolog}' and methodology a~ d(l~ 1vk Ooskr.y ( IQQ4), " . . . . . e 1T.1ight say that di!i(;unJive trade and interaction a.re not guidf: rI hy;m underlying logic or 11lda-ui~t:ount: but rather by multiple, evolving llonn.s of eonvc:rsatiOll. IIT11t:n: is no "Methodology of economics ... only sllstaim:ci verbal and "vrittr.n intcm.f'.tion which defies ab-stract characterization, because it is inherenl in the wHivoitiauly CUIu:reltc n;laliomhips obtaining beh . . . . . . een f:c.o nomists" (Davis ) 990: 33). One reason to think this is that there is growing c,\';dcnec that econ omic agents are not appropriately all modeled as individual, consrrau'led optilllizCl' N ead l overating williill a gr.ut:.ra l r.Q ll lli hrillm. Thus psychologists haw: argut:d that human dt:cision making ofifm no~!\ not satisfy the axiomatic requirements of neoclassical theory (cf Thalcr L 992). c lhit:isLs have ;jrgueo (hat individuals in markets often aet from non-!: :eJf-regarding, non-ut.iJityenhancing) altruistic motives ~e.g.) Sen HJ~7)j feminists have argued that power and p atriarchy socialty detennine the actions of " . . . . omen and mcn (perber and Nel~oT1 1993}) and a range of heterodox economists see class, corporate power, cu lture, social values., and a variety of other explanation:; of beh avior as being celltrally invotveu ill markets. Nom:: or lht:st::: lypt::s uf cxplanations are neatly suited to produ cing a modernist determinacy in Lhe analysis of exchange in markets. 'l'his strongly suggests that there arc good rC::U:;OIlS to Ldit:vc lhu.l market participants do Ilol ~l la.n~ in a slngle hig-lu:r logic ill 1.l1t: il' !'r:specliv~ in t. f':riu:tioos with one another, and that we acoordingly ought to attend_more carefully to different and changing forms of behavior in market activity. Consider hOU!' ir" .hoLd r-,Xc-lIangf: lli!twr:e:n womf:n and m~n in ahll!uve nome')tic violence relationships where trade is treated as 3. form of discurs ivl.: iuh:racliul1 . On the vie w above, constirutive and non-r.onstitutive r:onr:r.pr.'\ charac.r.e.rizp. thf': respective discourses. of women and men. How m ay wc undcrstand domestic violence in marriages involving production sp ecialization and exch ange ill terms of these two kinds of concepts? Farmer and Tiefr.nthalC":r (19Y7) f'.xplain domestic violence In non-cooperative relationships where men derive u tility from violtll<':c agaiu.s L WOIlleIl, amI WOfIH::ll uerive uliliLy liurn n:al income received in exchange. \'Vhile the Farmer-Tie±enthaler analysis expbins the behavior of both women and men formally in terms of a single mathematics of con.s trained oplimh:alioll) we may d~Jlart from and reinterpret their l..ltility analysis to dilJerentiate two distinct discourSe3 in L~c dillen:lIl arguments of women alii ) men's n::spct:tiv~ utility functions. Only men, not women, derive utility hUIll viokuu: pc::rpetrated a gaills l women. Thus WP. may say that constitutive of the discourse o f m e n engaged in spousal abuse .is a :;d . of conccpls Lhat I ic sl"' ;l f-t:'$(e('.m to spousa l abuse. In contrast, women may be said to understa nd lheir :>LaLUK as a product of paJ ri;t n:h),. Th~ c:onct:pt of patriarchy is constitutive of their discourse. Thus though formally each may be .~a.ici to haVf' : ul ility fUIlctiom, a morl!' : r.on rrete an.:llysis of their preferences gives us a b as,U; fur : mying that they r.ar.h 111i . . . . . <;t':~.~ <t oore of 8pecilic t:OrH:epts ' (hat make thf.ir di~('.ourses hig-hly incomm ensurate with one another.
At the same time, howev'er, there arc non-constitutive concepts in the ruSt:UltrSC of each which 'l.\"'e specific to nelther discourse, but which work togeth er with each one's constitutive concepls. Here 1-ve may i't ft:J' to n,mcepts which each possesses that concern such things as the value of fa mily :t.r lf.l hum!;, the:: imporlaJ Jct: of j oim incoml.':, f:ultural e.xpectatio ns about married life, desire for c.om panionswf,), and so on.'! A'S [lUI1-{.Qnstimtive, lhi~ h!.lj:~r set of ronef:ptc; operates dillet'endy for women a n d men according to how the)' 'l::-Sptx. Using a markr.t modd of d:isCOllTl!C, tlu.!.Il, J i!;;l:w·si\·e:: im eraeLlol1, like:: tt.:Ollomic excha n ge) is periodic, interrupted, and shifting-. Indeed, we may further oomp1i-rare th e pic:hlTI; a:hovt: in two ways. First, on <l posCIDodem view of di.scourse as a form of exchange. discursive parties presuma bly (Tilde al w allY .sites: ill the process simultancously reconstituting themselves in a varie ty of wa ys as they integ'rate "II,ltiplt $el s nf >;haJ\':d, n(IIH-:on5htutivt' : (",()n(",~p ts ' \o\.J.th their constirutive Ul Jt:,s. Se::cum], Jlothing ill t11t: analy~is he re requjres that oore -consrituti\,(: concepts be unch anging. '10 the extent thal w e a rc successful in characteri zin~ LUIlccpts specific to ~ discourse: c..:uIJ~L il.l lliVf: (~nJlr.C': pl·~ p(, s~e s~ a d"'gr~ of 'Slauili Ly. But clt:arly UII lite exeha.nge model of dis(;ursWc interaction the abundance of contacts between discourses argucs for ch ange in core, constitutive concepts. Of course discomse.s also die (lml art'; llf)rtl . Wit ho ut, (JJ . I.t~rnpllTlg to say hm.... changing interaction Lelwt:eH J.i::;cuur~CJ in. tenllS of non-constilutive concepts impacts on core concepts) we may simply say that the continual resitingof di~ruJ'!':ivt" int1":ranion mntributf:s to the elimination, crealion, and transformalion of discourses.
Thus thc re is considerable lUldecidability and indete rminacy in the framework. developed here to explain tbe relative. a.u t.o nom y and identity of disc.o IJTsa. Yt"t Ihis 1J1H 1~ci cl;{hilil y :iflll iHdl~l.t:rlll i mu;y lltjther QVe.rttu'ns that framework, n or leaves U8 with the non-c.ommunication diJcmma :set out abovc. Discourses do cOirun unica tc with one a nmher without rec:UlU"SI! lu a sillglt lJI tt 't-dj~wu l "St (;.tS individuals may interact in markets w:i(hont ;1 TI~lIdax." il ..,.. 1 ~1I · rnal i s.rn) , a wl yel. d iscourses may still be understood in terms of their distinct conditions of pmrlu(' ;tio n. D ocs this fram~work,. then, offer solid grounds. fo r su staining the Ruccio (19Y5} take Kr..YllCS' late emphasis on animal spirits a nd lU1ce:rtainty as an impenetrable ba rrier to calculative rationality, and thus as a n important postmode rn C' : 1f' .ln l' : J1 1 in Kf'.vJ1l':s' t.hinking that helped inlroduce ind eterminacy and undt:d dauili ty iJJlO conlempo.rary economic discoUJ1)c. Thcy sec thls as p art of "a progrfOssive slide into nihili'im" on KC.)11~~' part. , hut argue th a t Kt:yn~ should be prL-lised r~theT lhan UlI1cle.nlllnl fur il.. a (;eJ1t':ral ly, th!".n, nihili~rn for Amafigiio and Ruccio and many postmoderrllils is the view th a.t discoursc is always incomplete: fr agme n ted, a nd laden with indeterminacy. Em br(l cil.1g nihi lism thll. <: : means rejecting the modcrnis( prac tice (If Irie r<lfchically pri\.ilt!g·illg-t1Ll.lt:,· (IV!":'· cli~ol'(kr, and rceogllizing thatattcmpt:i to "domesticate H Wlcertainty are ultimatdy doom cd to taiJ (also d Amariglio and R uccio 1994). Thi s. vi~w would ~e.C':m to imply that the discursive world cannot be made up of uilrt:.r~nl, I'tla.Lively self-contained discourses, si . nce to suppose dill would be to 'Posit some dcgree of order over thc disord.er. \'Vhlle Am a riglio and Rnccio, as
